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The most important features to assess the severity of an epidemic are its size and its timescale.
We discuss these features in a systematic way in the context of SIR and SIR-type models. We
investigate in detail how the size and timescale of the epidemic can be changed by acting on the
parameters characterizing the model. Using these results and having as guideline the COVID-19
epidemic in Italy, we compare the efficiency of different containment strategies for contrasting an
epidemic diffusion such as social distancing, lockdown, tracing, early detection and isolation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In contrasting the COVID-19 epidemic, many coun-
tries and States resorted to strict social distancing mea-
sures, also known as lockdown. The general theory of
epidemic diffusion grants that this produces a lowering
of the epidemic peak and a slow down of the dynam-
ics. While this second aspect can be very positive – e.g.
giving to the Health System the time to strengthen its
capacities and more generally to prepare for the epidemic
wave – it also has negative aspects related to the social
and economic costs of a lockdown.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: on the one hand,
we want to discuss the temporal aspects of a lockdown
and more generally of epidemic moderation policies based
on social distancing; on the other hand, we want to stress
that other tools to counter the epidemic also exist, and
they have quite a different impact on the dynamics even
in the case they lead to the same reduction of the epi-
demic peak.
We will mainly work in the framework of the most
venerable epidemic model, i.e. the classical (Kermack-
McKendrick) SIR model [1–5]; this is specially simple
and will allow to obtain some analytical results. We
will also consider a recently introduced SIR-type model
taking into account one of the most striking features of
COVID, i.e. the presence of a large class of asymptomatic
infectives [6–17] (this is hence called A-SIR model, the
“A” standing for “asymptomatic”); in this case we are
not able to obtain analytical results, and our discussion
is based on numerical computations.
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The ideas discussed in this work were formulated in
recent works of ours [18–20]; the discussion, and some
of the applications, given here are original. The appli-
cations concern mainly the ongoing COVID epidemic in
Italy. A more detailed discussion of this application is
presented in a companion paper [21].
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section II we re-
call the classical SIR model and discuss some of its prop-
erties, in particular concerning the temporal aspects of
epidemic dynamics. In Section III we study how the SIR
properties discussed in Sect. II influence different strate-
gies of epidemic containment of management. This is in a
way a preliminary study, as the COVID-19 epidemic has
a striking feature, i.e. the presence of a very large set
of asymptomatic infectives (or pauci-symptomatic ones).
These are difficult to intercept, and thus are active in the
epidemic dynamic over a much longer time than symp-
tomatic infectives, which are promptly recognized as such
and isolated. We pass then to discuss, in Section IV, a
SIR-type model recently introduced to take this feature
into account [19], and called A-SIR model, see above. In
the following Section V we will discuss epidemic manage-
ment in the framework of the A-SIR model. Our discus-
sion so far is general; in Section VI we will apply this
general discussion to a concrete case, i.e. the ongoing
COVID epidemic in Italy. The A-SIR model describes
quite well the epidemiological data so far (provided one
takes into account the effect of the restrictive measures
put in operation by the Government in two rounds), as
shown in [19]; we will discuss some model’s projection
for the future under different strategies, i.e. changing
the model’s parameters in different ways – at first, more
sketchily, within the standard SIR framework, and then
in more detail within the A-SIR one. Needless to say,
these should not be seen as forecasts, but as providing a
qualitative insight into the effects, in particular the tem-
2poral ones, of different strategies. Finally, in Section VII,
we draw some short Conclusions.
II. THE SIR MODEL
The classical SIR model [1–5] concerns averaged equa-
tions for a population of “equivalent” individuals (thus
in Physics’ language it is a mean field theory); each of
them can be in three states, i.e. being Susceptible (of in-
fection), Infected and Infective, and Removed (from the
infective dynamic).
The populations of these three classes are denoted as
S(t), I(t) and R(t) respectively, and the dynamic is de-
fined by the equations
dS/dt = −αS I
dI/dt = αS I − β I (1)
dR/dt = β I .
where α and β are constant parameters, discussed in a
moment.
Note that the third equation amounts to a direct inte-
gration, R(t) = R(t0) + β
∫ t
t0
I(y)dy. Moreover, the total
population N is constant in time (people dying for the
considered illness are considered as removed).
Here the parameter α corresponds to a contact rate
(also called infection rate). More precisely, infection is
caused by the meeting of an infective and a susceptible,
thus the number of new infected per unit of time is pro-
portional to both S and I; the details of the infection
process are condensed in the parameter α. This takes
into account how easy it is for the pathogen to install
in the body of a susceptible once it gets the opportunity
to do so (thus what is the immune system reaction to
it), but also the frequency of “dangerous” contacts, i.e.
of contacts close (or unprotected) enough to give raise
to such an opportunity. E.g., for a virus transported by
droplets over a certain distance, this will be the frequency
of encounters at less than this distance and without due
individual protective devices. Social distancing measures
work on the reduction of α. Although they cannot act on
the biology of the pathogen and of the host, they reduce
the infection rate by making it difficult for the pathogen
to find new hosts.
The parameter β is a removal rate; more precisely, it
is the inverse of the typical removal time τ = β−1. For a
trivial illness (e.g. a cold) this is essentially the time for
the body to heal, but for a dangerous illness removal from
the epidemic dynamic will also take place by isolation,
which is assumed to take place as soon as the infective
is recognized as such. Thus, early detection campaigns,
followed by isolation of infected, work on the reduction
of τ , i.e. the increase of β.
The system (1) can be solved exactly in the time do-
main by means of time reparametrization, which allows
to linearize the dynamics [18]. The solution is given by
S = S0e
−ατ , (2a)
I = I0 + S0 − S0e
−ατ − βτ, (2b)
R = R0 + βτ, (2c)
where S0, I0 are initial data and R0 = N − S0 − I0. The
function τ(t) is defined implicitly by
t =
∫ τ
0
dτ ′
I0 + S0 − S0e−ατ
′ − βτ ′
. (3)
Remark 1. Exact solutions of the SIR model, which
are equivalent to our Eqs. (2a),(2b),(2c), (3) have
been derived, using a quite different approach by Harko,
Lobo and Mak [22]. Instead of performing a time
reparametrization, they first transform the main equa-
tion into a second order equation and then reduce it to
a first order non linear Bernoulli equation, which can be
explicitly solved. More recently, Barlow and Weinstein
[23] obtained an exact solution for the SIR equations in
terms of a divergent but asymptotic series [24] (see also
[25, 26] for a different approach to exact solution of SIR
and SIR-type models). We thank a Referee for bringing
ref. [23] to our attention. ⊙
Remark 2. Most of the analysis holding for the standard
SIR model can be extended to the case where the infec-
tion term takes the generalized form αf(S)I, with f(S)
an arbitrary smooth function – which in view of its epi-
demiological meaning should satisfy f(0) = 0, f ′(0) > 0
[27]. Some more recent studies, directly related to the
COVID epidemic, have also proposed – explicitly or im-
plicitly – nonlinear modifications of the bilinear infection
term of the standard SIR model [28, 29]. ⊙
A. Epidemic peak and total number of infected
The most important quantities, which describe the size
of an epidemic are the epidemic peak, i.e. the maximum
value I∗ attained by I(t) and the total number infected
individuals RE over the whole time-span of the epidemic.
The value of I∗ is crucial for understanding the max-
imum pressure that the epidemic is going to put on the
health system, whereas RE gives a measure of the death
toll the epidemic is going to claim.
It follows immediately from (1) that I(t) grows if and
only if
S(t) >
β
α
:= γ ; (4)
for this reason γ is also known as the epidemic threshold.
An epidemic can start only if S(t0) > γ, and it stops
spontaneously once – due to the depletion of the S class
corresponding to infections – S(t) falls below γ.
3An equivalent way to describe the epidemic threshold
is to introduce the reproduction number ρ(t) :
ρ(t) =
S(t)
γ
, (5)
which gives the expected new infections generated by a
single infection; its value at the initial time t0 is also
known as the basic reproduction number. The epidemic
starts if ρ(t0) > 1, and I(t) attains its peak value I∗ at
t = t∗, when ρ(t∗) = 1. Containment strategies aim,
by reducing α and/or by rising β, to reach ρ < 1, thus
stopping the epidemic. However, reaching ρ < 1 can be
costly in social and economic terms.
Remark 3. A possible alternative containment strat-
egy is to tune the parameters α and β in such a way to
maintain ρ ≈ 1 over a long time-span. In this way the
epidemic peak is transformed in huge plateau. In this
way a rather unstable equilibrium point for the epidemic
dynamics is generated, in which I is held at the constant
value I∗ for a long time. This may be a useful strategy
if the health system has the capacity to treat I∗ infected
until a vaccine for the disease is developed. Moreover
keeping the infected number at a relatively high level
helps in approaching herd immunity and thus preventing
a possible second epidemic wave, even if vaccine will not
be available. On the other hand, this approach requires
to keep the system in an unstable state. ⊙
By considering the first two equations in (1), we im-
mediately obtain that
I = I0 + (S0 − S) − γ log(S0/S) . (6)
This allows to predict immediately the epidemic peak. In
fact, we know that this will be obtained when S = γ (see
above), and hence
I = I0 + (S0 − γ) − γ log(S0/γ) . (7)
Note that in general in the initial phase of the epidemic
I0 ≃ 0; moreover, unless some – natural or artificial (vac-
cine) – immunity is present in the population, S0 ≃ N .
This is the case for COVID. Thus we get
I∗ = N − γ − γ log(N/γ) . (8)
Needless to say, these expressions for I∗ apply if (and
only if) S0 > γ and N > γ respectively: if S0 < γ there
is no epidemic.
Note that we are able to determine the height of the
epidemic peak but, so far, not at which time it is reached,
nor more generally any detail about the epidemic devel-
opment in time. This will be our task in the next sub-
section.
Before tackling that problem, though, we note that
(6) also characterizes the number of individuals going
through the infected state over the whole epidemic pe-
riod. In fact, at the end of the epidemic we get I = 0;
thus the number SE of susceptibles at that stage is the
(lower) root of the equation (here we use I0 ≃ 0 again)
(S0 − SE) = γ log(S0/SE) . (9)
This is a transcendental equation and again cannot be
solved in closed form, but it is obvious that the solution
will depend only on γ, and not on the values of α and
β producing this value for their ratio. The number of
individuals having gone through infection is of course
RE = N − SE . (10)
In view of the simplicity of the transcendent equation
(9) for SE , one might look for approximate solutions
SE(γ). We will not elaborate on this issue.
B. Timescale of the epidemic
There are two main quantities characterizing the
timescale of the epidemic: the time of occurrence t∗ of the
peak and the entire time-span tE of the epidemic, i.e. the
time for which I(tE) = 0. Both t∗ and tE depend on the
parameters α and β, and containment measures aimed at
reducing the size of the epidemic (i.e. I∗ and RE) do in
general have the effect of increasing t∗ and tE . We will
tackle this issue in the next subsection by determining
how I∗, RE , t∗ and tE change by scaling the parameters
α and β.
Let us first see how t∗ can be written in terms of α
and β. The time of occurrence of the peak can be easily
calculated using Eqs. (2b) and (3). We have
t∗ =
∫ τ∗
0
dτ ′
I0 + S0 − S0e−ατ
′ − βτ ′
,
τ∗ =
1
α
log
(
S0
γ
)
. (11)
Although here the integral has to be evaluated numeri-
cally, the previous expression allows to compute exactly
t∗ without having to integrate numerically the full sys-
tem (1). Moreover, Eqs. (11) will allows us to discuss
the scaling of t∗ when α, β change.
An analytic expression for t∗ can be found using an
approximate solution. In order to do this we consider
the relation between S and R; from the first and third
equation in (1) we easily get
S = S0 exp
[
−
(
R − R0
γ
)]
.
Using this and recalling (6), or equivalently I(t) = N −
S(t)−R(t), we can reduce to consider a single ODE, say
for R(t). This is written as
dR
dt
= β
[
N − S0 e
−(R−R0)/γ −R
]
. (12)
This is a transcendental equation, and – albeit the gen-
eral existence and uniqueness theorem for solutions of
4ODEs ensures the solution exists and is unique for given
initial conditions – cannot be solved in closed form. It
can of course always (and rather easily) be solved numer-
ically.
If – or until when – we have (R−R0)≪ γ, we can ex-
pand the exponential in (12) in a Taylor series, and trun-
cate it at order two. This produces a quadratic equation,
more conveniently written in terms of
P (t) := R(t) − R0 (13)
(hence with initial condition P0 = 0) as
dP
dt
= β
[
I0 +
(
S0
γ
− 1
)
P −
1
2
S0
γ2
P 2
]
. (14)
This equation can be solved in closed form (see e.g.
Sect. 10.2 in [2]), yielding
P (t) =
α2
S0
[(
S0
γ
− 1
)
+ κ tanh
(
β κ t
2
− φ
)]
,
(15)
with constants κ and φ given by
κ =
√(
S0
γ
− 1
)2
+
2S0 I0
γ2
,
φ =
1
κ
arctanh
[
S0
γ
− 1
]
.
Here again, taking into account that I0 ≃ 0, the expres-
sions are slightly simplified in that we get
κ =
(
S0
γ
− 1
)
. (16)
Note however that I0 ≃ 0 is a realistic assumption only if
we integrate the equations starting from an initial condi-
tion at the start of the epidemic; if we have to integrate
them from an initial condition when the epidemic is al-
ready running, we can not safely assume I0 ≃ 0.
The solution for R(t) is of course obtained by
R(t) = R0 + P (t) ,
see (13), which is promptly obtained from (15). As
dR/dt = βI(t), the epidemic peak corresponds to the
maximum of R′(t), which is the same as the maximum
of P (t). The solution (15) allows to compute the time
t∗ at which this is attained in a straightforward manner.
With standard computations, we get that this is reached
at
t = t∗ =
2 φ
β κ
. (17)
Recalling now the expressions for κ and φ, we get
t∗ = 2
arctanh
(
S0
γ − 1
)
β
[(
S0
γ − 1
)2
+ (2/γ2)S0 I0
] . (18)
As usual this gets slightly simpler assuming I0 ≃ 0, which
yields
t∗ =
2
β
arctanh
(
S0
γ − 1
)
(
S0
γ − 1
)2 . (19)
This (and also the more general (18)) shows that t∗
is inversely proportional to β. This relation is not sur-
prising, as β is the inverse of a time (the removal time);
in view of this remark, one has to expect that the in-
verse proportionality holds also without the assumption
(R−R0)≪ γ. This is indeed the case.
The other quantity characterizing the temporal devel-
opment of the epidemic is its entire time-span tE . This
can be computed by first setting I = 0 in Eq. (2b) in
order to compute τE and then using (3) to compute tE
from τE . The value of τE is given by the (higher) root of
the transcendental equation (we use I0 = 0 because it is
usually very small compared to S0)
S0 − S0e
−ατE − βτE = 0. (20)
tE is now obtained by computing (numerically) the inte-
gral in Eq. (3).
The timescale of the epidemic is obviously related to its
speed. In order to characterize this speed we can use the
time derivative of the reproduction number ρ evaluated
at the peak:
V∗ := dρ/dt|t=t∗ .
Using Eqs. (5), (2a) and (11) we find
V∗ = −αI∗. (21)
Notice that V∗ is proportional to α; thus, as expected,
the epidemic speed is controlled by the contact rate α.
C. Scaling properties of the SIR equations
Our discussion led us to determine, in the approxima-
tion (R−R0)≪ γ, the time at which the epidemic peak
is reached. This is surely a useful information, but in
many practical cases we would like also to have informa-
tion (i.e. prediction) about other features of the epidemic
curve. In particular, we would like to know when I(t) will
descend – after passing through the peak – below some
safety level Is.
In the (R − R0) ≪ γ approximation, this information
can be obtained from (12). But the point is that if we
are in the early stages of an epidemic – as in the present
COVID epidemic – we are not sure that such an approxi-
mation will be valid all over the epidemic development. It
is thus important to be able to analyze the time behavior
of R(t) – and through it, also of the other quantities S(t)
and I(t), see eqs.(1) above – without the (R − R0) ≪ γ
assumption.
5This analysis was performed in a recent paper of ours
[18], and we will give here the basic step and results
emerging out of it.
The first important observation is that the amplitude
of the peak I∗ (7) and the the total number of infected
(10) RE are decreasing functions of the parameter γ.
This can be easily shown by taking the derivatives with
respect to γ:
dIP
dγ
= − log
(
S0
γ
)
,
dSE
dγ
= −
(
γ
SE
+ 1
)−1
log
(
SE
N
)
.
Above the epidemic threshold (S0/γ > 1), dIP /dγ is al-
ways negative, whereas being SE < N , dSE/dγ is always
positive. Thus, we have a clear indication of how to fight
epidemics and how to reduce its size: we have to increase
the epidemic threshold γ, i.e. we have to scale γ → λγ by
a factor λ > 1. Increasing γ we reduce the reproduction
number ρ. If we manage to reduce ρ below 1 we simply
stop the epidemic, but even if we do not manage to go
so far we still reduce its severity by reducing both I∗ and
RE .
However, we have to pay a price. It is quite evident
that reducing the reproduction number we slow down the
dynamics of the epidemic, so that we increase its time-
span, i.e. t∗ and tE , and reduce its speed, i.e. V∗.
However, one can increase γ either by reducing α or
by increasing β. These two different ways of increasing
γ may have a different impact of t∗ and tE . That this is
true is already evident from the approximate expression
for t∗ given by Eq. (19): increasing β by a factor λ, t∗
is reduced by a factor 1/λ, with respect to the value
attained by reducing α.
In order to investigate in a systematic the scaling prop-
erties of epidemic parameters when we change γ → λγ,
we consider two different scaling transformations having
the same effect on γ: T (1), which reduces the infection
rate and T (2), which increases the removal rate:
T (1) : α→ λ−1α; T (2) : β → λβ, (22)
with λ > 1.
The quantities t∗, I∗, RE and tE do not transform in a
simple way under T (1) and T (2), but the ratios of T (1) and
T (2)-transformed quantities follow simple scaling laws.
Using the notation I
(1)
P = IP (λ
−1α), I
(2)
P = IP (λβ)
and similarly for the others quantities, to denote rescaled
quantities, we have (see Ref.[18] for details)
I
(1)
∗ = I
(2)
∗ , R
(1)
E = R
(2)
E ,
t
(2)
∗ = λ
−1 t
(1)
∗ , t
(2)
E = λ
−1 t
(1)
E , (23)
V
(2)
∗ = λV
(1)
∗ .
We see that the quantities I∗ and RE , describing the
size of the epidemic remain invariant (they do not depend
on α and β separately but only on their ratio γ), whereas
the quantities t∗ and tE describing the timescale of the
epidemic are reduced by a factor 1/λ and the speed V∗ is
increased by a factor λ.
We stress that our Eqs. (23) entail an important result:
different containment measures, which have the same ef-
fect on the amplitude of the peak I∗ and on the total
number of infected RE , have different impact on the oc-
currence time t∗ of the peak, on the whole time span of
the epidemic tE and on the epidemic speed V∗.
Using measures that increase the removal rate β by a
factor λ instead of reducing the infection rate α by the
same factor λ allows to reduce t∗ and tE by a factor 1/λ.
For instance, containment measures with λ = 2 reduce
by a half both the time needed for the epidemic to reach
the peak and the whole time-span of the epidemic. No-
tice that this epidemic timescale reduction effect is more
relevant when the reproduction number satisfies ρ ≫ 1.
The reduction factor λ is limited by λ < ρ (this is because
for λ > ρ the epidemic does not develop at all).
Remark 4. The scaling of V∗ in Eq. (23) gives a sim-
ple intuitive explanation of what happens. Acting on
β allows one to speed up the epidemic dynamics while
keeping constant the number of infective at the peak and
the total number of infected. This is possible because the
increasing of the removal rate allows prompt removal of
infected individuals. ⊙
Remark 5. Needless to say, the change in timescale can
be a positive or a negative outcome – and thus be sought
for, or avoided if possible – depending on circumstances.
If at the beginning of the epidemic the sanitary system is
overwhelmed by the number of patients, it is essential to
slow down the pace of the epidemic. On the other hand,
once the most critical time has gone, it becomes relevant
not to be forced to maintain restrictive measures for too
long, to avoid huge economical and social costs. This
suggests that contrasting the epidemic should be done
with different tools in different phases. ⊙
Summarizing, containment measures that increase β,
e.g. based on tracing and removal of infected, are more
efficient to fight epidemics in a short time than those that
reduce α, e.g. based on social distancing or lockdown.
Moreover if by increasing β we manage to bring ρ below
the threshold we simply stop the epidemic, but even if we
do not go so far, we can still reduce the size of an epidemic
keeping under control its timescale, i.e. without facing
the social and economical costs related to a prolonged
lockdown or however heavy restrictive measures.
III. EPIDEMIC MANAGEMENT IN THE SIR
FRAMEWORK
We have so far supposed that our problem was to an-
alyze the behavior of the SIR system for given control
parameters α, β, and given initial conditions.
6When we are faced to a real epidemic, as the ongoing
COVID one, any State will try to manage it (which can
mean reduce its impact or eradicate it completely, ac-
cording to what results to be concretely possible – which
depend also on how prompt is the action). When we an-
alyze the situation in terms of the SIR model, this means
acting on the parameters α and/or β.
As discussed above, the strategy are based on two types
of actions, i.e. social distancing, which can take also the
extreme form of a lockdown, and early detection (followed
by prompt isolation of would-be infected); these impact
respectively on the α and on the β parameter.
From the discussion of the previous subsections it fol-
lows immediately that acting on α and/or on β we can
reduce the height of the epidemic peak I∗ and simulta-
neously increase t∗, i.e slow down the epidemic dynamic.
This is well known, and indeed one of the reasons for
the social distancing measures and lockdown is to slow
down the epidemic increase so to have time to prepare
for the epidemic wave, e.g. in terms of Hospital – or
Intensive Care Units (ICU) – capacity, or in terms of
Individual Protection Devices (IPD) stocking.
The problem is that social distancing measures – par-
ticularly when they take the form of a lockdown – are
extremely costly in various ways: e.g. in economical and
social terms, as well known; but also in sanitary terms,
as a number of pathologies are surely worsened by an ex-
tensive time of physical inactivity, and hence a number
of extra casualties are to be expected as a consequence
of the lockdown. [40]
Thus, once the first epidemic wave has passed and the
Hospital system has been reinforced, it is essential to
be able to conclude the lockdown in reasonably short
times. Here it should be stressed that albeit in this occa-
sion “social distancing” (and hence,in terms of the SIR
model, a reduction of α) was considered as equivalent to
“lockdown”, these concepts are not the same. E.g., virus
transmission rate can be lowered by generalized use of
IPD. [41]
Remark 6. The main result of the previous sections
is that containment measures which increase β, such as
tracking and removal of infected individuals, are more
suitable for fighting epidemics – in particular once the
epidemic peak is on our back, or however if the Hospi-
tals can cope with the number of incoming patients – in
the sense they allow to contain the number of infected
people without expanding too much the time span over
which must be maintained. These kind of strategies are
also preferable – under the condition mentioned above –
because they have a much smaller social and economic
impact than those based on social distancing, in partic-
ular if these involve a lockdown. ⊙
In the following we will thus compare the effects of
varying the parameters α and β in the SIR model. This
will allow us to compare the effects of containment mea-
sures based on social distancing with respect to those
based on tracing and removal of infected. In particular,
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FIG. 1: Effect of varying parameters in the SIR model while
keeping γ constant. We have considered a population N =
6∗107 and integrated the SIR equations with initial conditions
I0 = 10, R0 = 0. Setting α0 = 10
−8, β0 = 10
−1d−1, the runs
were with α = α0, β = β0 (solid curve); α = α0/2, β =
β0/2 (dashed curve); and α = 2α0, β = 2β0 (dotted curve).
The curves yield the value of I(t)/N , time being measured
in days. The epidemic peak reaches the same level, with a
rather different dynamics.
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FIG. 2: Contrasting the epidemic through different strategies.
We plot I(t)/N for the same system and initial conditions as
in Fig. 1. Now we consider α = α0, β = β0 (solid curve,
black); α = α0/2, β = β0 (dashed curve, black); and α = α0,
β = 2β0 (dotted curve, black). Actions reducing γ by the
same factor through action on the different parameters pro-
duce the same epidemic peak level, but with a substantially
different dynamics. We also consider combining the action on
the α and the β parameters: this is shown in the blue curve,
which corresponds to α = α0/2, β = 2β0.
we focus on the temporal aspect, i.e for how long social
distancing measures or tracing ones can be needed. In
this respect, it is convenient to look at Figure 1, where
we show the effect of varying α ad β in such a way that
γ is constant; and at Figure 2, where we show the conse-
quences of raising γ by the same factor (not sufficient to
eradicate the epidemic) through action on the different
parameters.
It is apparent from (the black curves in) Fig. 2 that
the price to pay for a strategy based uniquely on social
distancing measures – in whatever way they are imple-
mented – is that these should be maintained for a very
long time. On the other hand, a strategy based on early
detection and prompt isolation alone, in agreement with
7the scaling behavior we have discussed in the previous
sections, reduces the peak without slowing down the dy-
namics. This feature can of course be a positive or neg-
ative one, depending on how ready is the Health System
to face the epidemic wave.
In real situations, of course, one should act by combin-
ing both strategies; different mix of these will produce
different time development, and it is not obvious that
the choice should be necessarily for the strategy allowing
a greater reduction of the epidemic peak, once all kind
of sanitary, economic and social considerations are taken
into account. This is shown in (the blue curve in) Fig. 2,
where it appears that the strategy combining full action
on both parameters reduces greatly the level of the epi-
demic peak, but also makes the epidemic running for a
very long time: this may be convenient or not convenient
depending on factors which cannot be taken into account
by the purely epidemic model.
For example, we can consider that strict measures
should be in effect until the level of infectives descends
below a fraction 10−4 of the population; we denote as ts
the time at which this level is reached. What this means
in terms of the duration of the intervention in the dif-
ferent framework considered in Fig. 2 is summarized in
Table I.
Note also that here we considered a given initial time
of the epidemic and suppose the restrictive measures are
maintained until the situation improves enough. In real
situations, the restrictive measures will not be set as soon
as the epidemic reaches the country, but only after the
number of infectives raises above some alert threshold,
call this time ta; this has indeed been the pattern in most
countries, with some notable exceptions (such as Greece
and New Zealand – they were indeed very lightly struck
by COVID). Thus using ts as an estimate of the length
of lockdown leads to overestimating it, and the duration
of the measures is better measured by τ = ts − ta. This
is also considered in Table I, assuming the alert level is
the same as the safety one, i.e. I(ta) = I(ts) = 10
−4 ∗N .
In Table I we also give the value of RE/N ; this shows
clearly that in these simulations we do not have R/γ ≪ 1
(recall N > γ), hence we can not use the approximation
leading to (19). In fact, e.g. in Fig. 2 it appears that rais-
ing β does lead to a (small) delay in the epidemic peak,
contrary to what is predicted by the “small epidemic”
formula (19).
IV. THE A-SIR MODEL
The SIR model – besides all the limitations due to its
very nature of a “mean field” theory, and the absence
of any age or geographical structure – has a weak point
when it comes to modeling the COVID epidemic. That
is, it does not take into account one of the more striking
features of this epidemic, that is the presence of a large
set of asymptomatic infectives.
α/α0 β/β0 γ/γ0 I∗/N t∗ ts τ RE/N
1 1 1 0.535 35 125 113 0.997
1/2 1/2 1 0.535 70 251 226 0.997
2 2 1 0.535 17 63 56 0.997
1 2 2 0.300 41 94 78 0.940
1/2 1 2 0.300 82 189 157 0.940
1/2 2 4 0.063 144 246 182 0.583
TABLE I: SIR model. Height and timing of the epidemic
peak I∗ = I(t∗) and time for reaching the “safe” level (I(ts) =
10−4S0), together with duration of the interval τ = ts−ta and
the fraction RE/N of individuals having gone through infec-
tion, for the different combinations of parameters considered
in the numerical runs of Fig. 1 and 2. See text. Note that
RE/N depends only on γ, as guaranteed by eqs. (9), (10).
A. The model
In order to take this into account, we have recently
proposed a variant of the SIR model, called A-SIR (with
the “A” standing of course for “asymptomatic”), see [19].
In this, there are two classes of infected and infective
individuals, i.e. symptomatic ones I and asymptomatic
ones J ; to avoid any possible misunderstanding, we stress
that we put in the I class all patients which will develop
symptoms, also before these arise, and in the J class
patients which will not develop symptoms at all. Corre-
spondingly, there are two classes of removed, R for those
who are isolated – and eventually dead or recovered –
after displaying symptoms, and U for those who are not
detected as infective by their symptoms and hence are
removed only when they naturally heal (unless they are
detected by testing contacts of known infectives or by a
random test).
The key point is that the mechanism of removal is dif-
ferent for the two classes, and hence so is the removal
rate. We denote as β the removal rate for infectives with
symptoms; this corresponds to isolation, with a mean
time β−1 from infection to isolation. We denote by η the
removal rate for asymptomatic infectives, with a mean
time η−1 from infection to healing.
If an individual is infected, it has a probability ξ ∈
(0, 1) to develop symptoms. It is assumed that all infec-
tive with symptoms are detected and registered by the
Health System; as for asymptomatic ones, only a fraction
of them is actually detected (and in this case promptly)
isolated.
Within this description, ξ is a biological constant [42];
on the other hand a campaign for detecting asymp-
tomatic infectives – e.g. by mass random testing – would
result in a reduction of the average time η−1, i.e. raising
η. On the other hand, a campaign for tracing contacts
of registered infectives would result in early isolation of
would-be new infectives – both symptomatic and asymp-
tomatic – and hence in a raising of both β and η.
It should be mentioned that a similar model could be
8considered, where the distinction is not between symp-
tomatic an asymptomatic, but simply between regis-
tered and unregistered infective. In this setting ξ can
be changed by a testing campaign, while by definition η
cannot be changed as it corresponds to natural healing of
people who are never discovered to be infective; we will
not discuss this setting (see [20] for this point of view).
The A-SIR model is described by the equations
dS/dt = −α S (I + J),
dI/dt = α ξ S (I + J) − β I,
dJ/dt = α (1 − ξ)S (I + J) − η J, (24)
dR/dt = β I,
dU/dt = η J .
Note that the last two equations amount to integrals,
i.e. are solved by R(t) = R0 + β
∫ t
0 I(y)dy, U(t) = U0 +
η
∫ t
0
J(y) dy. Moreover, the total population N = S +
I + J +R+ U is constant.
Unfortunately, for this model few analytical results are
available, and one can only resort to numerical simula-
tions. On the other hand, these show that the A-SIR
model can account quite well for the COVID epidemic in
Italy [19], i.e. in the only case where it has been tested
against real epidemiological data.
Remark 7. Note that according to eqs.(24), symp-
tomatic and asymptomatic patients are infective in ex-
actly the same way. This is not completely realistic, and
it should be seen as a simplifying assumption. In fact,
our goal here is to point out how taking into account the
presence of asymptomatic infectives changes the overall
picture one would obtain by standard SIR model, and to
do this not by a fully realistic model (see e.g. [31–33]
in this regard) but by the simplest possible model taking
into account the phenomenon. Actually, it is not clear
if the infectivity of asymptomatic should be considered
lower or higher than that of symptomatic (recall these are
considered infectives only until symptoms become serious
enough to grant hospitalization or home isolation, after
which they are effectively removed from the infective dy-
namics): on the one hand the viral charge emanating
from them could be lower than for symptomatic, but on
the other hand they are as active as fully healthy people,
and also people in contact with them do not take the
elementary precautions which would be taken if facing
somebody with even mild early symptoms (cold, cough,
etc). Thus – in the absence of reliable medical and social
information – we have chose to consider them equally in-
fective to get a simpler model. The problem has been
raised in a recent paper by Neves and Guerrero [34],
where a modified model with a further parameter tak-
ing into account the difference in infectivity has been
considered. That is, the terms αS(I + J) of our model
are changed into αS(I + µJ). These authors state that
they have run simulations with different values of µ and
determined that this makes little difference on the overall
dynamics. ⊙
Remark 8. This seems a suitable place to also point out
that infectivity is of course not immediate upon infection,
so that an “Exposed” class should also be introduced, so
to consider a SEIR-type [2–5] model; here too we pre-
ferred to disregard this feature, which appears not to
be essential when we study the impact of asymptomatic
infectives, in order to keep to as simple as possible a
model. Similarly, we have considered a constant total
population, thus disregarding birth and death processes
(in this regard we note that e.g. in the first three months
of COVID infection there were about 30,000 cases; in this
same period in previous years there were about 300,000
deaths [35]). ⊙
Remark 9. A number of models of SIR type have been
proposed in connection with COVID-19. In order to com-
pare model prediction with epidemiological data, some
of these models focus on the number of deaths, consid-
ered more reliable than those on the infected. As the
reader may have noticed, here instead we do not con-
sider at all deaths; we would like to briefly comment on
this choice. On the one hand, we do not believe that
data about deaths are - at this stage - more reliable than
those on infections: data about deaths of people with
other pathologies beside COVID are managed in different
countries according to different protocols, which within
Europe are actually more varied than those leading to
classification of infection cases (after PCR or swab tests).
Moreover, data about variations in the death rate com-
pared with previous years are not only available with a
notable delay, but also mix excess deaths due to COVID
with those due to other pathologies (e.g. ictus or heart
attacks, which may be increased due to tension and home
confinement) and less deaths due to other causes – such
as road or work accidents – prevented by lockdown. Fur-
thermore, deaths are classified as due to COVID only in
the presence of a test certifying this, and such a test is
not always performed.
One should also consider that mortality is presumably
evolving (in a positive sense) as hospitals are less crowded
and as doctors learn how to treat COVID cases. In par-
ticular, the discovery that many COVID-related deaths
are not due to pneumonia but to pulmonary micro-
embolism, and the ensuing (rather simple) treatment pro-
tocol based on heparin and similar drugs changed in quite
a substantial way the medical situation. Moreover, a
large part of the deaths in the first wave occurred in se-
nior citizen residences, and were increased by the fact we
did not know that asymptomatic infections had such a
dominant role in the spreading of infection; now that this
is known, and that it has been realized how critical these
residences (and in general communities) are, infection of
the most fragile part of the population became less fre-
quent, and this also reduces the mortality rate. Thus, in
short, we do not believe that one can consider the mor-
tality rate as a constant parameter, and we prefer to deal
with the infection data, which are elaborated following a
protocol which is possibly not fully reliable, but at least
is (for most countries) not changing in time. ⊙
9B. The fraction of symptomatic infectives
We will also sometimes write
K(t) = I(t) + J(t)
to denote the whole set of infectives; the fraction of symp-
tomatic infectives will thus be
x(t) :=
I(t)
K(t)
, (25)
while that of asymptomatic will be y(t) = 1− x(t).
It should be noted that albeit the probability ξ of each
new infective to be symptomatic is a constant, the frac-
tion of symptomatic infectives x(t) is a dynamical vari-
able, and will change over time. The evolution equation
governing the change of x is easily written as
dx
dt
=
d
dt
I
K
=
(dI/dt)K − I (dK/dt)
K2
=
β(ξS/γ − 1)I K − I (αSK − βI − ηJ)
K2
= β
(
ξ
S
γ
− 1
)
I
K
− x
(
αS − β
I
K
− η
J
K
)
= β
(
ξ
S
γ
− 1
)
x − αSx + β x2 + η x (1 − x)
= − [αS(1− ξ) + (β − η)] x + (β − η)x2 .
Note that here S is itself changing in time, so there is
not a nontrivial fixed point for x(t).
It should also be noted that in the initial phase of the
epidemic S can be considered as constant, S ≃ S0 ≃ N ;
within this approximation both symptomatic and asymp-
tomatic grow exponentially as a combination of two ex-
ponentials, through the linear equations
dI/dt = (α ξ S0 − β) I + α ξ S0 J
dJ/dt = α (1 − ξ)S0 I + (α (1 − ξ)S0 − η) J .
These lead to x(t) < ξ; this is easily understood qual-
itatively: in fact, asymptomatic infectives stay in the
infective state for a longer time. This is also shown in
Fig. 3.
The situation is just opposite if we look at R(t) and
U(t): the fraction of registered removed χ = R/(R+ U)
will be higher than ξ at all times, but will converge to ξ
for large t; see Fig. 4.
Note that this figure offers an explanation for the
widely different estimates of ξ appearing in the literature
as result of testing campaign. In fact, in several cases
it has been attempted to measure ξ from the statistics
of testing campaign over a complete population (e.g. for
the early evacuation flights from Wuhan [36], for the Di-
amond Princess cruise ship [37], or for the Vo` Euganeo
community [6]) or on a random sample of population; but
Fig. 4 shows that we would obtain quite different results
if attempting to measure the fraction of asymptomatic
20 40 60 80 100
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
20 40 60 80 100
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
FIG. 3: Upper plot: the function x(t) computed along the nu-
merical solution to the A-SIR equations (24) with S0 = 6∗10
7 ,
α = 10−8, β = 10−1, η = (1/3) ∗ 10−1, ξ = 0.1; the initial
conditions are I0 = 10, J0 = 90, R0 = U0 = 0; these imply
x0 = 0.1. Note x(t) first goes to a plateau at x ≃ 0.09, and
then decays towards zero. Lower plot: the functions I(t)/S0
(solid curve) and J(t)/S0 (dashed curve) for the same numeri-
cal solution. It appears that the decay of x(t) starts when I(t)
reaches its maximum. This corresponds to I∗/S0 ≃ 0.058 and
is reached at t∗(I) ≃ 27.24; the maximum of J(t) corresponds
to J∗/S0 ≃ 0.703 and is reached at t∗(J) ≃ 29.08 > t∗(I).
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FIG. 4: For the same numerical solution of the A-SIR equa-
tions considered in Fig. 3, we plot χ(t) (blue) together with
x(t) (black) and the reference line for the value of ξ (red). The
function χ(t) converges to ξ for large t, with x(t) ≤ ξ ≤ χ(t)
at all times.
active infectives (which would be done by nasopharyn-
geal swab testing) or of those who have had the infection
(which would be done by serological testing). This re-
mark is specially relevant in view of the planned wide
testing campaigns.
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C. Epidemic peaks in the A-SIR model
One striking feature of the A-SIR model is that the
epidemic threshold is different for the I and the J classes.
In fact, it follows from (24) that I grows for
S >
β
α
x
ξ
=
x
ξ
γ := γ1 , (26)
while J grows for
S >
η
α
1− x
1− ξ
:= γ2 . (27)
This implies that in general the number of symptomatic
and asymptomatic infectives peak at different times.
Let us now show that when β ≫ η the peak of I, i.e.
γ1, occurs before the peak of J , i.e. γ2. In order to do
this we use the first equation in (24) to eliminate dt from
the second and third equations:
dI
dS
= −ξ +
β
α
x
S
,
dJ
dS
= −(1− ξ) +
η
α
1− x
S
.
We can now eliminate x from the previous equations by
constructing an appropriate linear combination of them.
We obtain in this way
η
dI
dS
+ β
dJ
dS
= −ω +
ηβ
αS
, (28)
where ω := ηξ + β(1 − ξ).
Remark 10. We note in passing that equation (28) can
be easily integrated to give J as a function of I and S:
J(S) = J0−
η
β
(I(S)−I0)−
ω
β
(S−S0)+
η
α
ln
(
S
S0
)
. (29)
In turn, this equation can be used to eliminate J from
the system (24) and to obtain an autonomous, first order,
ODE for I(S). Unfortunately, this equation is an ugly
non linear ODE which cannot be solved analytically. ⊙
Coming back to the determination of the peaks, we
consider the peak for J , occurring at S = γ2, and insert
the condition dJ/dS = 0 into equation (28). Because
we have γ1 ≥ γ2 whenever S = γ2 belongs to the region
of decreasing I, i.e. to the region where dI/dS ≥ 0,
from the resulting equation we find that γ1 ≥ γ2 for
γ2 ≤ (βη)/(ωα). This gives, using the definition of γ2 in
Eq. (26),
I
J
≥
ηξ
β(1− ξ
. (30)
For values of S in the region S ≫ γ1, γ2, i.e. at small
times, the second (S-dependent) terms in Eqs. (28) can
be neglected and the early dynamics is determined solely
by ξ, so that the latter equation gives
I
J
≈
ξ
1− ξ
. (31)
Inserting (31) into (30), we find that in this region the
condition (30) is satisfied whenever β > η. We have seen
in the previous subsection that x(t), hence also I/J , stays
almost constant before it reaches the peaks for I and J
(see the plateau in Figs. 3 and 4 ). This implies that at
least for β ≫ η, the inequality (30) remains true until
the peaks are reached, hence that γ1 > γ2.
V. EPIDEMIC MANAGEMENT IN THE A-SIR
FRAMEWORK
We have seen above that in the frame of the standard
SIR model the epidemic peak can be reduced in several
ways, i.e. acting on one or the other (or both) of the
parameters α and β; these different strategies, however,
yield quite different results in terms of the temporal de-
velopment of the epidemic.
It is quite natural to expect that the same happens in
the frame of the A-SIR model. But, as mentioned above,
we are not able so far to provide analytical results for the
A-SIR model; we will thus have to resort to numerical
integration.
It should be mentioned that here we have one further
parameter on which we have no control, i.e. ξ, and one
further parameter – besides α and β – on which we do
have control, i.e. η.
Remark 11. We have seen in Sect. IV that the epi-
demic threshold is different for the I and the J classes.
Moreover we have shown that, at least for β ≫ η, the
peak γ1 for I occurs before (in time) that for J , i.e. γ2;
recalling that dS/dt < 0, this means γ1 > γ2. This fact
has an intuitive explanation. At very early times the dy-
namics is ruled by ξ and we have x ≈ ξ, which implies
I/J ≈ ξ/(1 − ξ). Because γ1 is proportional to β and
γ2 is proportional to η, for β ≫ η we have in this region
γ1 > γ2 (see Eqs. (26) and (27)). At intermediate times,
although x changes and we have x < ξ, the difference in
the removal rates β, η does not affect fully the dynamics,
and x stays almost frozen in a plateau till the peaks are
reached, preserving in this way the γ1 > γ2 relation. It is
only at late times, that is after surpassing the peaks, that
the difference in the removal rates β, η affects fully the
dynamics and correspondingly x changes significantly. ⊙
We can thus act on our system in three independent
ways, i.e. by social distancing (reducing α), by early
isolation of symptomatic (raising β), and by detection of
asymptomatic (raising η).
It should be stressed that while implementation of the
first strategy is rather clear, at least in principles (things
are less clear when other, e.g. economical and social, con-
siderations come into play), for the other two strategies
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α/α0 β/β0 η/η0 γ/γ0 K∗/N I∗/N t1 t2 ts τ
1 1 1 1 0.730 0.058 29 28 94 82
1/2 1/2 1/2 1 0.730 0.058 58 55 188 164
2 2 2 1 0.730 0.058 14 14 47 41
1/2 1 1 2 0.568 0.039 60 57 129 104
1 2 2 2 0.568 0.039 30 29 65 52
1/2 2 2 4 0.348 0.020 68 65 124 92
TABLE II: A-SIR model. Height and timing of the epidemic
peak K∗[t1] and of the peak for symptomatic I∗ = I [t2] (note
t1 6= t2) and time for reaching the “safe” level (I(ts) =
10−4S0), together with duration of the interval τ = ts − ta
defined in terms of symptomatic infectives, for the different
combinations of parameters considered in the numerical runs
of Fig. 5 and 6. See text. In all cases nearly all the population
goes through infection, and a fraction ≈ ξ with symptoms.
the implementation is less clear, and in practice consists
of two intertwined actions: tracing contacts of known
infectives, and large scale testing. Tracing contacts al-
lows to identify those who are most probably going to
be the next infectives; they can then be isolated before
any symptom shows up, i.e. β−1 can be reduced below
the incubation time. On the other hand, this strategy re-
quires to test would-be infectives after some reasonable
delay, to avoid quarantining a huge set of non-infective
individuals. One could also imagine, if tests were widely
available, that specific classes of citizens (e.g.sanitary op-
erators, or all those being in contact with a large number
of persons) could be tested thus identifying a number
of asymptomatic infectives not known to have had con-
tacts with known infected; this would lead to isolation
of asymptomatic, and hence to a raising in η. Note η is
also raised by tracing contacts, as many of the infected
found in this way would be asymptomatic, but would be
promptly isolated in this way.
To put things in a simple way, actions on β and on η go
usually, in practice, together. Thus we should essentially
distinguish between social distancing on the one side, and
other tools on the other side.
In order to do this, we resort to numerical computa-
tions for a system with parameters strongly related to
those of the SIR numerical computations considered in
Sect. III above, and along the same lines. The results
of these are illustrated in Figs. 5 and 6; these should be
compared with Figs. 1 and 2.
We also consider the quantities analogous to those con-
sidered in Table I; these are given in Table II.
It is rather clear that the same general phenomenon
observed in the SIR framework is also displayed by the
A-SIR equations. That is, acting only through social dis-
tancing leads to a lowering of the epidemic peak but also
to a general slowing down of the dynamics, which means
restrictive measures and lockdown should be kept for a
very long time. On the other hand, less rough actions
such as tracing contacts and the ensuing early isolation
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FIG. 5: Effect of varying parameters in the A-SIR model
while keeping γ constant. We have considered a population
N = 6 ∗ 107 and integrated the A-SIR equations with ξ =
0.1 and initial conditions I0 = 10, J0 = 90, R0 = U0 = 0.
Setting α0 = 10
−8, β0 = 10
−1d−1, η0 = 4 ∗ 10
−2d−1, the runs
were with α = α0, β = β0, η = η0 (solid curve); α = α0/2,
β = β0/2, η = η0/2 (dashed curve); and α = 2α0, β = 2β0,
η = 2η0 (dotted curve). In the upper plot, the curves yield
the value of K(t)/N , time being measured in days; in the
lower plot, thy refer to I(t)/N . The epidemic peak reaches
the same level, with a rather different dynamics.
allow to reduce the peak without having to increase the
time length of the critical phase and hence of restrictions.
VI. THE ONGOING COVID EPIDEMIC – ITALY
Our considerations were so far quite general, and in
the numerical computations considered so far we used
parameter values which are realistic but do not refer to
any concrete situation.
It is quite natural to wonder how these considerations
would apply in a concrete case; we will thus consider the
case we are more familiar with, i.e. the ongoing COVID
epidemic in Italy. This is also of more general interest
since Italy was the first Western country to be heavily
struck by COVID; as it appears Asian countries have
dealt with the problem in a rather different way than it
is done in the West, the Italian case is used as a test
case in many other countries to foresee what can be the
developments taking one or another choice. [43]
Our data and considerations refer to the moment of
closing the first submitted version of this paper, i.e. April
25, 2020. Time is measured in days, with Day 0 being
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FIG. 6: Contrasting the epidemic through different strategies.
We plot K(t)/N (upper plot) and I(t)/N (lower plot) for
the same system and initial conditions as in Fig. 1. Now
we consider α = α0, β = β0, η = η0 (solid curve, black);
α = α0/2, β = β0, η = η0 (dashed curve); α = α0, β = 2β0,
η = 2η0 (dotted curve); and α = α0/2, β = 2β0, η = 2η0 (solid
curve, blue). Actions reducing γ by the same factor through
action on the different parameters produce the same epidemic
peak level, but with a substantially different dynamics.
February 20, 2020.
The problem in analyzing a real situation is that the
parameters are not constant: people get scared and adopt
more conservative attitudes, and government impose re-
strictive measures. All these impact mainly on social
distancing, i.e. on the contact rate α [44]. Moreover,
any measure shows its effect only after some delay, and
of course not in a sharp way – as incubation time is not
a sharp constant but rather varies from individual to in-
dividual.
A. Fit of real data by the SIR and A-SIR dynamics
In related works [18, 19] we have considered the SIR
and the A-SIR models, and estimated parameters values
– that is, α and β for the SIR model, α, β, η and ξ for
the A-SIR one – allowing them to satisfactorily describe
the first phase of the COVID epidemic in Italy; we have
then assumed that each set of restrictive measures has the
effect of changing α to rα (with 0 < r < 1 a reduction
factor), and that this effect shows on after a time β−1
from the introduction of measures. This is a very rough
way to proceed, but it is in line with the simple approach
of SIR-type modeling.
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FIG. 7: Fit of epidemiological data (points) by the function
R(t) arising from numerical solution of the A-SIR equations;
see text for parameter values and other details. Here time is
measured in days, with day 0 being February 20.
In Italy (total population N ≃ 6 ∗ 107) a first set of
restrictive measures all over the national territory was
adopted on March 8, and another one on March 22. In
the framework of the A-SIR model, our estimate of the
parameters for the first phase of the epidemic (that is,
before the first set of measures could have any effect, i.e.
before March 15) was the following, with time measured
in days:
α0 ≃ 3.77 ∗ 10
−9 , β−1 ≃ 7 , η−1 ≃ 21 ;
ξ ≃ 1/10 . (32)
See [19] for details on how these estimates are obtained.
When looking at data in the following time, we as-
sumed that the contact rate α is reduced by the restric-
tive measures (and public awareness) and is changed from
α0 into α1 = r1α0 between March 15 and March 29, and
then into α2 = r2α0 from March 29 to April 25. Our
best fit for the reduction factors ri is
r1 = 0.5 ; r2 = 0.2 .
In Fig. 7 we plot epidemiological data for the cumula-
tive number of detected infections against the numerical
solutions to the A-SIR equations for these values of the
parameters, and for initial data obtained also from the
analysis of real data. This shows a rather good agree-
ment. See also Fig. 8.
If we were considering the SIR model, some care should
be put on the estimation of β; to avoid any confusion, we
will here denote by B the removal rate for the SIR model,
keeping β for the removal rate of symptomatic infectives
in the A-SIR model.
In the SIR model, indeed, there is no distinction be-
tween symptomatic and asymptomatic infectives; thus B
is an average quantity computed over the whole set of
infectives. This means that it is related to the A-SIR
quantities by
B = β x + η (1 − x) . (33)
As we have seen above in Sect. IVB, x = x(t) is a
dynamical variable. Actually x(t) < ξ, but it remains
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FIG. 8: Fit of epidemiological data (points) for new daily in-
fectives, obtained by the function I(t) arising from numerical
solution of the A-SIR equations; see text for parameter values
and other details. Here time is measured in days, with day 0
being February 20. Left: Raw data for daily new infectives.
Right: Smoothed data, smoothing corresponding to average
over five days.
sufficiently near to ξ in the growing phase of the epidemic.
So our rough estimate for B will be
B ≃ β ξ + η (1− ξ) ; (34)
with the values given above for the A-SIR parameters,
this yields
B ≃ 2/35 ≃ 0.057 ; B−1 ≃ 17.5 . (35)
This number by itself, compared with the incubation time
of about 5 days for COVID, urges for a campaign of early
tracing.
We can then try to compare a numerical solution of
the SIR equations with these parameters – and similar
reduction factor for the contact rate as a result of restric-
tive measures – with epidemiological data. This is shown
in Fig. 9, showing a reasonable agreement. Note however
that in order to obtain this agreement we had to set
α0 = 3.1 ∗ 10
−9 . (36)
We note that Figures 7, 8 and 9 are reproduced from
arxiv:2003.08720v3; the published version of this pa-
per [19] contains updated plots, showing that the model
describes correctly the epidemiological data up to date
of publication, provided one takes into account another
step in the reduction factor r; see [19] for details.
B. Simulating further interventions. The SIR
picture
Albeit we believe that the A-SIR dynamics is better
suited to describe the COVID epidemics, we will start
by considering simulations of further interventions on the
epidemic dynamic within the SIR framework; this with
the purpose so that the reader can observe how the same
qualitative picture we will find – and study in more detail
– within the A-SIR framework is also rendered by this
more classical model.
In Fig.10 we have considered an epidemic dynamic
which until day 55 is just the one considered in Fig.9,
while in subsequent days is either continuing in the same
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FIG. 9: Fit of the epidemiological data for Italy by the SIR
model with varying α parameter. This plot reports epidemio-
logical data for the cumulative number of registered infective,
thus R(t), day by day; day zero is February 20. The fitting
curve is the solution to the SIR equations with initial values
(computed in day 14, i.e. March 5) I0 = 16, 914, R0 = 3, 862
and for a population of S0 = 6 ∗ 10
7. The parameters value
were α0 = 3.1 ∗ 10
−9 before March 15, then changed into
α1 = r1α0 between March 15 and March 29, and then into
α2 = r2α0 from March 29 on; and β = 2/35 ≃ 0.057 as stated
by Eq. (35).
way, either has a further halving of the α parameter, ei-
ther has a doubling of the β parameter, either has both a
halving of α and a doubling of β. It is rather clear from
the picture that acting on β is much more effective from
the point of view of shortening the time needed to get
to a low level of infectives in the population. Moreover,
it also appears that once β is increased, an accompany-
ing cut in α (i.e. further social distancing measures) is
nearly irrelevant from this point of view – while we know
it would be very hard in terms of economic and social
costs.
The more detailed analysis in terms of the A-SIR
model, to be conducted in the next subsection, will con-
firm this picture.
C. Simulating further interventions. The A-SIR
picture
We can now simulate further intervention, with four
possible strategies:
1. Do nothing, i.e. keep α, β, η at the present values;
2. Further reduction of α by a factor σ;
3. Increase of β and η by a factor σ;
4. Simultaneous reduction of α and increase of β and
η, all by a factor σ.
We stress that these are not equally easy; we have con-
sidered the same reduction/increase factor in order to
better compare the outcome of these three actions, but
as so far all the intervention has been on α, one should
expect that further reducing it is very hard (even more
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FIG. 10: Simulation of different containment strategies (after
day 55, for Italy) within the SIR model; the initial parameters
are α0 = 3.1∗10
−9 , β0 = 2/35, with α changing to α1 = α0/2
and to α2 = α0/5 at days 25 and 35 respectively, see text.
After day 55 we consider a dynamics going on with the same
parameters (black curve, dashed) together with: one in which
the parameter α is further halved, thus getting to α3 = α0/10,
while β remains at β = β0 (blue); one with α staying at
α = α2 while β is doubled, thus going at β = 2 ∗ β0 (orange);
and one where α is halved and β is doubled (red). The plot
shows the function I(t) along the numerical solutions.
so considering “side effects” of this on society, economics,
and other sanitary issues); on the other hand, no specific
campaign designed to increase β has been conducted na-
tionwide so far [45], so we expect action in this direction
would be quite simpler an has more room for attaining a
significant factor.
Despite these practical considerations, as already an-
nounced, we consider the same factor for the reduction
of the contact rate and for the increase of the removal
rates, in order to have a more direct comparison of the
effects of these strategies.
We have then ran numerical simulations corresponding
to the different strategies listed above; the outcome of
these is given in Fig. 11. Note that within each strategy
the decay of I(t) is faster than that of K(t), and that the
ratio between I(t) ad K(t), i.e. x(t), is in all cases rather
far from ξ = 0.1, as discussed in Sect. IVB above.
We also report in Table III the relevant expected data
for the time ts at which a safety level Is – now assumed
to be Is = 3, 000, i.e. half of the level reached when
the first restrictive measures were taken – is reached, the
time interval τ = ts − 55 from the day the new strat-
egy is applied, and the total count RE of symptomatic
infected. This table also reports the asymptotic value
xE of the ratio x(t) = I(t)/K(t) of symptomatic to to-
tal infectives; this is relevant in two ways: one the one
hand one expects that only symptomatic infected may
need hospital care, so a low level of x means that albeit
a number of infections will still be around only a small
fraction of these will need medical attention, and COVID
will not absorb a relevant part of the Health System re-
sources; on the other hand, this also means that most
of the infectives will be asymptomatic, i.e. attention to
identifying and isolating them should be kept also when
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FIG. 11: Simulation of different strategies after day 55 for
Italy. Strategies correspond to those listed in the text, with
factor σ = 2. The curves illustrate the predicted outcome
under different strategies: no action (black, dashed); further
reduction of α (blue); increase of β and η (yellow); reduction
of α and increase of β and η (red). The plots represents,
from the upper one to the lower one: cumulative number of
symptomatic infected R(t); number of symptomatic infectives
I(t); total number of infectives K(t) = I(t) + J(t); ratio of
symptomatic to total infectives, x(t) = I(t)/K(t).
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α/α2 β/β0 η/η0 ts τ RE xE
1. 1 1 1 289 234 > 5 ∗ 105 0.031
2. 1/2 1 1 107 52 2.4 ∗ 105 0.019
3. 1 2 2 81 26 2.4 ∗ 105 0.019
4. 1/2 2 2 68 13 2.1 ∗ 105 0.010
TABLE III: Time ts of reaching the safety level Is, time from
adoption of new strategy to ts, and total final count RE of
symptomatic infections, for the different strategies listed in
the text, with a factor σ = 2.
the number of symptomatic infections is very low. Note
that for the strategy (1) what we report is not really an
asymptotic value, but the value expected at December
31, as the decay is too slow.
Remark 12. In this regard, it may be interesting to note
that according to our model at the end of April (day 70)
we will have
x ≃ 0.032 ,
R
R+ U
≃ 0.124 . (37)
Again according to our model and fit, at the same date
the fraction of individuals having gone through the in-
fection – and thus hopefully having acquired long-time
immunity – would however be still below 3% nationwide;
this is obviously too little to build any group immunity.
The situation could be different in the areas more heav-
ily struck by the epidemic, such as Bergamo and Brescia
Departments. ⊙
Remark 13. Needless to say, these plots and the fig-
ures given in Table III should not be seen as forecasts,
both because we consider parameters to be constant in
the future – which will quite surely not be the case –
and more relevantly because SIR-type models do not take
into account any structure (neither geographical, nor age-
related, nor considering different general health status)
of the population, and hence are definitely too rough to
make any reliable prediction. On the other hand, we be-
lieve these models can give relevant qualitative insights.
The one emerging from our present work is that a strat-
egy for epidemic contrast based only on social distancing
requires to keep very strong social distancing measures,
possibly a general lockdown, for very long times. This
is not due to details of the models considered here –
in which case the result would be just irrelevant – but
to the basic mechanism of infection propagation through
contact (thus quadratic terms coupling infectives and sus-
ceptibles) and of isolation or healing through mechanisms
involving a single individual (thus linear terms). ⊙
D. Discussion
Table III shows, in our opinion quite clearly, that:
1. Continuing with present measures is simply unten-
able, as it would leave the country in this situation
for more than one further semester, and a large
number of new symptomatic infections – hence also
of casualties – with the ensuing continuing stress on
the Hospitals system.
2. Further restrictions in the direction of social dis-
tancing would have to be kept for nearly two fur-
ther months; they would be effective in reducing
the number of symptomatic infectives in the fu-
ture. On the other hand, as individual mobility
is already severely restricted, this would basically
mean closing a number of economic activities which
have been considered o be priorities so far (includ-
ing in the most dramatic phase), which appears
quite hard on social and economic grounds.
3. A campaign of early detection could be equally
effective in reducing the number of infected and
hence of casualties, but would require to main-
tain restrictions already in place for a much shorter
time, less than one month. This should be imple-
mented through contact tracing, which does not
necessarily has to go through the use of technology
endangering individual freedom, as shown by the
strategy used in Veneto.
4. Combining further social restrictions and early de-
tection would reduce the number of infections to a
slightly smaller figure and would need to be imple-
mented for about two weeks. This would however
meet the same problems related mentioned in item
(2) above, albeit for a shorter time.
5. In all cases except if no action is undertaken, the
faction of symptomatic infectives should soon fall
to be between 1 and 2%. This means we fore-
see a reduced stress on the Hospital system, but
a continuing need to investigate, track and isolate
asymptomatic infections, to avoid that at the end
of restrictions they can spark a new epidemic wave.
These considerations are of course not final; but we
trust they offer a picture of what the consequences of
different strategies are for what concerns strictly the epi-
demic dynamics. Decision makers will have of course to
consider other aspects: social, economical, political, and
also sanitary concerning other kind of pathologies.
Remark 14. We would like to stress an important point.
There are by now many papers discussing what the likely
future of the COVID epidemic in this or that country
should be; many of these are based on a purely statisti-
cal analysis. Here we base our discussion on a theoretical
model, which takes into account the basic mechanism for
the transmission of the infection elucidated above and the
presence and key role of asymptomatic infectives. Sta-
tistical analysis independent of any detail for the mecha-
nism is known to be a powerful tool, but this applies when
16
we have a large database. For COVID we have only data
“on the fly” – except for the Chinese case [38, 39], but the
data available for this have been questioned, and impor-
tant corrections on key quantities (e.g. the total death
toll) were done with respect to the initially estimated
data. In our opinion, it makes little sense to resort to a
purely statistical analysis when the underlying database
consists of a single complete experience. ⊙
Remark 15. When it comes to translate the indications
of the models into concrete action, the word should pass
to real experts – i.e. medical doctors working on infec-
tive pathologies. No model can describe how e.g. the use
of IPD (depending moreover on how well the population
is instructed on their use) impacts on the α parameter,
or the like for other parameters. Last but not least, our
discussion and the predictions of the models are based
on the assumption that the strategies are correctly imple-
mented. If e.g. a country decides to follow the strategy
based on early detection, but the implementation of this
is not correct (e.g. if there is not the possibility to carry
out a sufficient number of rapid tests), following the right
strategy will result in the wrong outcome. This is again
something which cannot be discussed by a mathemati-
cal model; but it should be mentioned that not only it
is important to avoid an excessive trust in such general
models, but also when the conclusions are robust (as we
think to be the case for the present discussion), the way
in which the indications of the model are implemented
can make a huge difference. ⊙
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered – in the framework of “mean field”
epidemiological models of the SIR type, hence disregard-
ing any structure in the population – how different strate-
gies aiming at reducing the impact of the epidemic per-
form both from the point of view of reducing the epidemic
peak and the total number of people going through the
infection state, and from the point of view of reducing
the time-span of the acute crisis state.
This has been discussed in general terms, both within
the classical SIR model [1–5] framework and with use of
the recently formulated A-SIR model [19], providing also
some general results; in this setting, however, one deals
with models with given parameters, constant in time.
On the other hand, in a real epidemic – as the ongoing
COVID one – growing public awareness and governmen-
tal measures modify these parameters. We have consid-
ered a real case (Italy) from this point of view. After
recalling that the A-SIR model considered in this paper
do quite well fit the epidemiological data so far, we have
discussed what would be the impact of different strate-
gies for the near future, showing that also in this case
the models predict a much shorter duration of the criti-
cal phase if further action concentrates on early detection
of infectives rather than on social distancing.
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